Operations and tactics from mid-2000, JI planned a series of attacks with bombs – some of which were successful and some of which not – which is defined as a terrorist group and drew its willingness to use violent methods to advance its objectives. These attacks with AC pumps, as well as the evolution of communication practices that have supported the Group’s bombing operations and other activities, are discussed below. It pays special attention to the operations of decision-making. The examination was extended to other functional areas, including training, logistics, and operational safety practices. It is important to note that although the bombing attacks have attracted considerable attention, they were only one aspect of the many activities of AC has conducted as a militant Islamic organization. The Group has also been strongly committed in the construction of its base of recruits and sympathizers through missionary work as well as other activities of jihad, such as sending members of the AC to participate in conflicts sectarian in the East of Indonesia. bombing one of the defining characteristics as a terrorist group has been his willingness and ability to carry out major bombing operations.
Since 2000, joint implementation of various sophistication bombardment operations have been conducted against a wide range of types of destination in Indonesia, Philippines and Singapore. From the JI attack in mid-2000 in Jakarta for the bombing of the Embassy of Australia in Jakarta in September 2004. It also includes the foiled plot to bomb sites in Singapore, including the United States.UU. and the embassies of Israel, because this was an effort to well developed by the time it was interrupted by the arrests carried out by Singapore authorities. Although AC is suspected of having participated in some other attacks throughout Southeast Asia in recent years, there is no definitive confirmation and the scant information available about the details of the attacks.
After the attacks of Bali.Con pumps of Bali also underestimated the capacity of the Government to track down using the registration number of the vehicle found in the truck of debris scattered in the place of the explosions. The ability of the Government to rebuild the registration number of the vehicle, despite the efforts of agents of the AC to clear before the detonation of bombs, was a major break in the investigation. This important forensic testing helped to identify members who participate in the joint implementation of the attacks and it has directly led to their arrests. In addition to these deficiencies in operational safety, joint implementation has suffered significant wear leadership, since many of its key leaders have been captured or killed in counterterrorism operations since the 9 / 11 attacks. However, it is not clear if the capacity of the Government authorities to find and stop these leaders and other actors above indicates a deficit in systemic JI operational security practices or is simply the result of hard work and good luck by national intelligence agencies. The learning experience in the joint implementation of operational safety against the fight against domestic and international terrorism demonstrates the efforts both operational and tactical success of the deficit. The Group took effective measures to reduce the risk that Government authorities which discover their steps in the construction of a terrorist organization and carrying out its first bombing operations. It is able to pass unnoticed, not only by the intelligence and police services of the countries in which it was operating, but also by foreign intelligence services.